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Cross-market linkages allow transmission of shocks among markets. Previous measures of such spillovers are based on 
broader stock market indexes, which cannot identify the industries that are the principal drivers of spillovers and the 
industries that are most exposed to the spillovers.  Using investable equity indexes, we show that basic materials, 
financials, industrials, technologies, and telecommunication equity sectors were the primary exporters of volatility from 
the U.S. and that the magnitude of the spillovers increased primarily during andpost-2008 financial crisis. There is 
evidence that Canada was most vulnerable to spillovers, while China’s exposure was the lowest among the countries in 
the sample. Based on the minimum variance portfolio optimization, we find that investing in foreign industries with low 
exposure to spillovers from the U.S. generates high Sharpe ratios for U.S. portfolio managers, especially during the 
financial crisis.  
 
Keywords: Volatility, spillover, meteor shower, VIX, investable equity indexes, financial crisis, portfolio 
optimization.JEL Code: F36, F65, G01, G11, G15. 
 
I. Introduction 
An unintended consequence of capital market connectedness is that systemic risk is transmitted 
across borders, affecting economic growth, investor confidence, and capital flows.  As evidenced during 
the 2008 financial crisis, the global equity market experienced significant declines, 1  and according to 
Batram and Bodnar (2009), falling from an all-time high of $51 trillion in October 2007 to $22 trillion by 
the end of February 2009.  Such catastrophic declines show the extent to which the global equity market is 
vulnerable to the transmission of systemic shocks.  From a policymaker’s viewpoint, it is essential to 
identify whether volatility is homegrown (heat waves) or imported (meteor showers)2, so that appropriate 
policy is designed and implemented to safeguard the domestic capital market (see Elaysiani et al. 
(2015)).Investors care about the linkage because financial spillovers can increase the correlation between 
markets and reduce diversification benefits. 
In this paper, we examine U.S. equity market return spillovers to several of its trading partners.  
Return spillovers (from hereafter, spillover) are estimated as variance decompositions using the Diebold 
                                                          
1The major stock market indices, on average, have declined by more than 10%, while emerging stock market indices 
have fallen by close to 30%. 
2Engle et al. (1990) were first to introduce these terms to describe whether market volatility is driven by its own 
innovations or affected by innovations from a foreign market. 
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and Yilmaz (2009 and 2012) procedure (from hereafter, DY method).  The DY method decomposes the 
forecast error variance of a given market’s returns into components attributable to its own innovations and 
innovations of other markets. Using the DY method, we identify spillovers from the major U.S. investable 
3equity sectors, including basic materials, consumer staples, financials, health care, industrials, oil and gas, 
technology, telecommunications, and utilities to identical equity sectors in selected trading partners.  The 
foreign trading partners are Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Spain, Russia, and the United Kingdom.  According to the U.S. Treasury, stock markets in these foreign 
countries attract significant U.S. investments.  We believe that through international portfolio investment 
from the U.S., volatility in these U.S. sectors eventually spills over to their foreign counterparts.  Our 
objective in this paper is to estimate the magnitude of this spillover and show the extent to which the U.S. 
portfolio managers can use the spillover measures to guide international investments. 
At the country level, we find that Canada was most exposed to the U.S. volatility during the full 
sample, while China was least exposed.   During the pre-financial crisis4 (January 2, 2002 – February 14, 
2007), Canada was again most exposed while China was least exposed in all nine equity sectors.  The 
results are similar during the financial crisis (February 15, 2007 – April 30, 2009).  The fact that Canada has 
high exposure to the U.S. market is consistent with Canada’s proximity to the U.S. and trade between these 
two neighbors.  What is interesting is that China was least exposed to the U.S.-specific volatility despite an 
increasing level of trade and investment between them5 .  Finally, spillovers during the post-financial 
crisis(May 1, 2009 – September 21, 2015)are similar to the previous results.  Canada was most exposed, 
while China was the least vulnerable country. 
At the industry level, we identify the specific foreign equity sectors that are exposed to spillovers 
from their U.S. equity sector counterparts.  For the full sample, basic materials and oil and gas, contributed 
most to  spillover from the U.S, while the utilities sector contributed the least.  During the pre-financial 
                                                          
3 Investable equity indices are typically custom-tailored and are constructed, considering several factors, including 
liquidity, market capitalization, float, and trading volume.  These indices are proprietary in nature. 
4 The dating of the samples is arbitrary though it generally matches the full timeline of the crisis as reported by the St. 
Louis Fed (https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline). 
5We find this result interesting, and it perhaps supports our anecdotal claim that China has been able to keep its 
capital market insulated through restrictions on foreign capital flows.  
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crisis, the oil and gas sector (utilities) was the highest (lowest) contributor to spillover.  During the financial 
crisis, the U.S. technology sector was a larger contributor to spillovers than the financial sector.  The 
utilities sector was the lowest contributor to spillovers.  Finally, post-financial crisis, the oil and gas (utilities) 
was the largest (smallest) transmitter of volatility, possibly due to the highly volatile crude oil market.  
Between 2014 and 2016, the Brent crude oil price fell from $110 to about $30 per barrel. 
These results are important for both regulatory purposes and global asset allocation.  If volatility 
transmissions encourage a knee-jerk reaction among regulators to insulate the home country’s capital 
market, it can affect international capital flows.  For asset allocation, high spillovers lead to high equity 
market correlation and exposure.  As a result, diversification benefits from investing in countries exposed 
to spillovers would be lower, and subsequently, capital flow to these countries may decline.  Minimum 
variance portfolio optimization using the spillover magnitude as a criterion confirms that investing in 
foreign countries and their industries with low exposure to the U.S. volatility generates high Sharpe ratios 
for the U.S. portfolio managers. 
We make several contributions to the literature.  First, the results suggest that the use of broader 
stock indexes can offer only a limited view of the spillovers for the countries in the sample. Instead, a 
sectoral analysis identifies the major sources of spillovers6.  Second, in contrast to the existing literature, we 
find a slight time variation in the magnitude of the spillovers.  Third, we also identify the countries and the 
equity sectors that can offer more significant international diversification benefits to the U.S. portfolio 
managers.  Finally, we show that at times, the spillover measure is distinctly different than the correlation 
between aforeign country’s returns with that of the U.S.  In fact, there are instances where the spillover 
measure deviates from the return correlation.  Even though both are based on the covariance structure of 
returns, correlations are purely contemporaneous while spillover measures incorporate dynamics.  We, 
therefore, believe that the information content of these two measures of connectedness have vastly 
                                                          
6The study by Kouki et al. (2011) is the only study that offers a similar approach to studying volatility transmission 
from the U.S. banking sectors to the banking, financial services, industrial, real estate, and oil sectors in selected 
developed and emerging markets.  We consider ten investable U.S. equity indices for transmitting volatility to the 
corresponding investable equity sectors in the developed and developing countries.  As discussed in later sections, our 
volatility transmission model is based on important trade and portfolio linkages between the U.S. and its selected 
trading partners.  Furthermore, our study differs in terms of the methodological treatment of volatility transmission. 
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different implications for international portfolio diversification.  In other words, diversification benefits 
differ whether one is using the correlation or the spillover measure as a criterion. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the relevant literature on the volatility 
transmission framework.  Section III provides empirical analysis.  The final section concludes. 
II. Volatility Transmission Mechanism 
A World Bank study identifies several volatility transmission channels based on trade, capital flows, 
commodity, and investor confidence7.  Trade channels include imbalances in external trade as a result of 
currency volatility and technological innovation induced productivity changes.  The financial transmission 
channel considers the flow of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment as a result of either an 
arbitrage mechanism or international diversification.  Linkages among banks can magnify spillovers 
because of interconnectedness in risk exposure.  Remittances are also vital to the transmission of shocks 
from one country to another.  The commodity channel points to the effects of instability in the 
commodities market in light of imbalances in supply and demand.  According to the study, investor 
sentiment is an important catalyst for the transmission of shocks across borders. 
Spillover captures volatility transmission where a foreign market affects the conditional variances 
of returns in another market (see Hamao et al. (1990)).  Econometric studies on volatility transmission can 
be divided into two strands.  The first strand examines whether volatility is homegrown or imported.  
Engle et al. (1990) examine the intra-daily behavior of the Yen/Dollar exchange rate with reference to the 
hypotheses of a heat wave (homegrown volatility) and meteor showers (imported volatility).  The authors 
find evidence of meteor shower, as opposed to a heat wave type spillover.  Another article by Susmel and 
Engle (1994) investigates the timing of volatility spillover between the New York and London equity 
markets.  The study reports that the evidence of volatility spillover between these markets is minimal, and 
the impact lasting for an hour or so.  The article by Melvin and Melvin (2003) examines the volatility 
spillover of Mark/Dollar and Yen/Dollar exchange rates across global markets.  They find statistically 
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significant effects for both own-region and inter-regional spillovers.  They also suggest that heat waves are 
more critical than meteor showers.  Clements et al. (2015) use high-frequency (10-minute) futures data on 
the dollar index, Treasury bond, and S&P500 equity index during 2003-2013 and find that meteor shower 
and heat wave effects are equally significant.  Golosnoy et al. (2012),using intra-day data of the Dow Jones 
and DAX, find evidence of significant short-term volatility spillover within both markets, as well as across 
the two markets (meteor shower effect).  They find that the spillover effects between the U.S. and the 
German stock markets are of significantly longer duration and increased after the subprime crisis, which 
indicates substantial contagion effects.  Beale (2005) investigates volatility spillover from the U.S. markets 
to 13 European equity markets using weekly data from January 1980 to August 2001.  The study finds that 
spillover intensities increased in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.  Beale 
contends that increased trade integration, equity market development, and low inflation have contributed 
to the increase in the intensity of the volatility spillover in the European Union.   
There is also evidence that volatility spillover is time-varying, intensifying in times of stress.  For 
example, see Elyasiani et al. (2015), Hamao et al. (1990), and Theodossiou and Lee (1993).  Elyasiani et al. 
(2015) examine the return and volatility interdependence among the U.S., the UK, the EU, and Japanese 
banks and insurers for the period 2003 to 2009.  The study reports strong returns and volatility 
transmission within and across the banking and insurance sectors.  The relationship exhibited contagion-
like symptoms during the crisis period of 2007 to 2009, with the U.S. financial institutions acting as 
information providers in global markets.  Kanas (1998) investigates the return and volatility spillovers 
across three major European markets, namely, London, Frankfurt, and Paris, from January 1984 to 
December 1993.  The study reports bi-directional spillovers between London and Paris and Frankfurt and 
Paris, with unidirectional spillover from London to Frankfurt.  The study finds that the magnitude and 
intensity of the spillover increased during the post-crash period.  Beirne et al. (2008) explore the issue of 
volatility spillover and contagion from mature markets to 41 emerging stock markets.  They suggest that 
the spillover from established markets influences the conditional variance of return in many local and 
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emerging markets -furthermore, the spillover parameter changes during turbulent periods in developed 
countries.  
The second strand of the literature looks at volatility transmission using the generalized spillover 
index, developed in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009 and 2012).  Broadly speaking, the DY method, applied in 
this paper, combines the notion of meteor showers and heat waves (Engle et al. (1990)), generalized 
forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) (Sims (1980a and 1980b)), and generalized impulse 
response functions (IRF)(Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996), and Pesaran and Shin (1998) (hereafter 
KPPS)).  The FEVDs8, in percentage terms, decompose the forecast error variance of a dependent variable 
into components attributable to own innovations and that of other explanatory variables.  The pth order, 
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where )...,,( ,21 Ntttt ZZZZ   is a vector of N endogenous variables, Bi are i = 1,…, p are NXN 
autoregressive coefficients matrices, and εt̴(0,∑)is a vector of i.i.d. error terms that are serially uncorrelated; 
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where the NXN coefficients matrices Ai follow the recursion
pjpiii ABABABA   ...2211  with 
0A  being an NXN identity matrix and 0iA  for i < 0.9  The total and directional spillovers are produced 
by the generalized forecast-error variance decompositions of the moving average representation of the 
system (1).  The FEVDs define the ‘own variance shares’ as a fraction of H-step-ahead variance for 
forecasting iZ , for i = 1, 2, …N and ‘cross variance share or spillover’, as the fraction of H-step-ahead error 
                                                          
8 For expository convenience, this section is heavily drawn from Diebold and Yilmaz (2012).   
9Interested readers are referred to Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, and Lee (1988), and Sims (1980b) for a detailed 
derivation of the moving average representation and the calculation of FEVDs, and Koop et al. (1996) for a 
discussion of generalized impulse response functions. 
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variances for forecasting 
jZ , for i, j =1, 2,…N, such that ji  , for each i.Using the notion of H-step-
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where ∑ is variance matrix for the error vector ε, σii is the standard deviation of the error term for the ith 
equation, and ie  is the selection vector with the ith element as one and zeros otherwise.  The own variance 
and cross variance shares are listed in the main diagonal and off-diagonal elements of )(H matrix, 
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The total spillover  (TS) captures the contribution of risks from all sectors to the total forecast error 
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and spillover from market i to all other markets j as 
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Both spillover measures are utilized to create the total spillover index.10  Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) 
examine both total and directional volatility spillover across U.S. stock, bond, foreign exchange, and 
commodity markets using daily data and a framework of generalized vector autoregressive model for 
January 1999 to January 2010.  The study finds evidence of minimal spillover before the global financial 
crisis period of 2007.  However, volatility spillovers intensified from the stock market to other markets 
after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
Since the publication of the DY method, many scholars have examined volatility spillover between 
financial assets and countries (see Demirer et al. (2018) and references therein).  Kouki et al. (2011) consider 
key industry sectors such as banking, financial services, industrial, real estate, and oil, of selected developed 
and emerging markets over the period January 2002 to October 2009.  They find that both shocks and the 
volatility of the U.S. banking sector are transmitted to developed and emerging markets, confirming the 
hypothesis that the U.S. plays a dominant role in the diffusion of information.  Barunik et al. (2016) 
investigate asymmetries in volatility spillovers using 21 most liquid U.S. stocks from seven sectors 
(financials, information technology, energy, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, telecommunication 
services, and health care).  The study finds that from August 2004 to December 2011, there was evidence 
of asymmetric connectedness among stocks at the sectoral level.  Also, the spillover of bad and good 
volatility was transmitted at varying magnitudes across sectors over time.  The study also reports that intra-
                                                          
10As an anonymous referee pointed out, the spillover measure of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) is not an index in true 
sense since the sum of a row in the variance decomposition matrix can be greater than one.  Our interpretation is that 
the DY model has its roots in the unrestricted VAR model of Sims (1980a, 1980b), which is based on orthogonal 
innovations. While the row sum is equal to one, the variance decomposition results are sensitive to the ordering of 
the variables. Criticisms associated with the orthogonal identification scheme of unrestricted VAR contributed to the 
subsequent development of structural VAR, triangularization, and the generalized IRF.  Under this scheme, the 
variance decomposition results are invariant to the ordering of the variables. Also, the row sum may not be equal to 
one.  The variance decomposition or variance allocation from the IRF and VDCs, in percentage term, demonstrates 
what fraction of variability of one market is contributed by innovations of another market.  While VDC is not an 
index, some researchers have coined the term as an index.  
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market spillover increased substantially during the financial crisis.  The sector-level heterogeneity in the 
transmission mechanism of volatility spillovers was attributed to the activity of informed traders (which 
reduces volatility) and uninformed traders (which increases volatility). 
The DY model has also contributed to the development of network 11  analysis to study 
connectedness among countries.  Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) suggest several connected measures (total, 
directional connectedness from and to, bidirectional pairwise directional connectedness, and net directional 
connectedness) constructed from components of variance decompositions.  They demonstrated the time-
varying nature of connectedness across thirteen major US financial institutions during May 1999 through 
April 2010 with a particular emphasis on the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.  Demirer et al. (2018) 
estimate the high-dimensional network among the world’s top 150 publicly traded banks during 2003-2014.  
Results from both static and rolling window methods show that global bank connectedness has a strong 
geographic element while the sovereign bond markets are weakly connected.  They find that network 
movement mostly stems from cross-country rather than within-country bank linkages. Finally, the authors 
document time variation in global connectedness, with stronger ties emerging during a crisis period. 
Along a similar line of research, the paper by Wang et al. (2018) examines volatility connectedness 
in the Chinese banking system using fourteen publicly traded commercial banks over the period 2008 to 
2016.  The study demonstrates that joint-stock and city commercial banks emit greater volatility 
connectedness than state-owned commercial banks.  Yarovaya et al. (2016) investigate the problem of intra-
and inter-regional return and volatility spillovers across ten developed and eleven emerging markets in Asia, 
America, Europe, and Africa for the period 2005 through 2014.  They show that markets are more 
exposed to domestic and region-specific volatility shocks than to inter-regional volatility shocks.  The study 
also reports that the emerging Asian markets exhibit a lower level of spillover within the region compared 
to Europe and the Americas.  Their results suggest that Asian markets are a more attractive destination for 
portfolio investment.  In another study, Wang et al. (2017) note that the US market is highly correlated with 
                                                          
11 The recent network literature emanates from the mathematical graph theory.  See Acemoglu et al. (2015) and a list 
of references therein for additional details. 
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other G7 countries (except Japan) and Brazil during the pre-crisis period and that the US market is less 
correlated with the markets of China, India, and Russia.  During the financial crisis period, the correlation 
between the US market and all other countries increase significantly; but the correlation with China 
remains low.  Finally, Yi et al. (2018) use the spillover index and network analysis, suggested by Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2014) and Demirier et al. (2017), to investigate the volatility connectedness in the 
cryptocurrency market.  They show fifty-two cryptocurrencies are highly interconnected and that larger 
coins such as Bitcoin and Litecoin are major contributors to spillover.   
Overall, the DY model has become popular for analyzing return and volatility spillovers and 
connectedness among countries and financial assets.  Yet, the practical use of the connectedness measure 
based on the stock market spillover measure has not been adequately explored.  This is a major 
shortcoming because it is important for the regulatory agencies to identify the home country industries’ 
exposure to shocks from foreign industries to design policies.  Furthermore, the degree to which a capital 
market is exposed to external shocks can also be used as a screening device for constructing internationally 
diversified portfolios.  For example, investing in countries and industries with low exposure to spillovers 
could allow the U.S. portfolio managers to hedge the U.S.-specific systemic risk.  Surprisingly, this line of 
research where the magnitude of meteor showers is used as a screening device to guide international 
diversification is missing. 
III. Empirical Analysis 
We use daily data for the period from January 2, 2002 to September 21, 2015.  The sample is split 
into four separate regimes to examine the dynamic nature of spillover: Full Sample (January 2, 2002 – 
September 21, 2015), Pre-Financial Crisis (January 2, 2002 – February 14, 2007), Financial Crisis (February 
15, 2007 – April 30, 2009), and Post-financial Crisis (May 1, 2009 – September 21, 2015).  These 
subsamples are expected to capture structural breaks due to significant economic and political events, 
including the financial crisis and the European debt crisis during this period.  There are two ways we can 
identify the structural breaks for creating the subsamples.  The first approach is to use an econometric 
model that includes exogenous variables that represent financial and economic news events and timelines 
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(see Baur (2012), and Dimitriou and Kenourgios (2013), the Federal Reserve Bank (the Fed) of St. Louis 
(2009), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), (2009)).  Alternatively, the subsamples can be 
derived from econometric models.  For example, Boyer et al. (2006), Fry et al. (2010), and Rodriquez (2007) 
employed regime-switching models to determine the existence of two regimes (stable and volatile) where 
the ‘volatile’ regime defines the crisis period.  We chose the first approach to create the subsamples using 
the timelines reported by the Fed and the BIS. 
Data on sectoral investable equity indices are collected from the Datastream12.  Returns (log-
relatives) are based on end-of-day closing prices.  To avoid nonsynchronous trading and time zone 
differences, European and North American financial data are matched on a daily basis.  Asian market data 
were lagged one day to account for the fact that the U.S. still remains as the leading source of market 
volatility13. 
As noted earlier, our choice of countries and equity sectors is based on data on capital flows from 
the U.S.  According to the U.S. Treasury, at the end of 2013, the U.S. equity portfolio managers held $5.7 
trillion in foreign stocks out of $6.47 trillion investments in foreign securities (Table 1)14.  The United 
Kingdom, Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Korea, Australia, Brazil, Italy15, and China are among the 
leading countries receiving the bulk of equity investments from the U.S. In addition, Russia16 and India 
were added based on recent data on foreign direct investment from the U.S.17. 
To identify the sources of volatility in the primary equity sectors in the U.S., we first examined the 
flow of funds from the U.S. to the foreign countries by industry, as reported by the U.S. Treasury(Table 2).  
We selected all equity sectors listed in the table, except for a few instances where the composition of a 
particular U.S. equity sector did not precisely match the foreign equity sector.  Our universe includes the 
                                                          
12The sample period is based upon data availability.  We thank ThomsonReuters for the data. 
13We perform robustness tests later to show that our results are not sensitive to nonsynchronous trading data. 
14The total holding of foreign securities by the end of 2018 is $11.3 trillion.    
15Italy is and remains as a major destination for investment flow from the U.S. For example, the flow data for Italy 
were as follows: $66b (2010), $91b (2016), and $115b (2018).  We are unsure why the data for Italy was not reported 
in the 2013 report. 
16Direct investment position of the United States in Russia from 2000 to 2014 (in billion U.S. dollars, on a historical-
cost basis). http://www.statista.com/statistics/188637/united-states-direct-investments-in-russia-since-2000/ 
(accessed March 4, 2016). 
17India West, Thursday, March 3, 2016. 
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following ten investable equity sectors from each country: the broad market index (MSCI Investable Index), 
basic materials, consumer staples, financials, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, 
telecommunications, and utilities).  We then matched these foreign equity sectors in Table 2 with their 
identical (or close) counterparts in the U.S., noting that a perfect match in some cases was not possible. 
To make sure that volatility in the preceding U.S. equity sectors reflects investor sentiment and 
contributes to the spillovers to identical sectors in international trading partners, we estimate the Pearson 
correlation between the VIX index and the U.S. equity returns.  The VIX18 index, which is a measure of 
the expected uncertainty in the broad U.S. equity market, is also known as the ‘fear index’.  Table 3 (Panel 
A) shows that the returns on the VIX and the USMSCI are negatively correlated, supporting the view that 
the VIX is a conveyor of uncertainty in the U.S. market.  Panel A, Table 3 also shows that during the 
financial crisis, the correlation fell to -.76, and post-financial crisis correlation drops to -.80, suggesting that 
uncertainty in the equity market is associated with declining stock returns.  The U.S. sectoral equity returns 
are also negatively correlated with the VIX returns.  For the full sample, the lowest negative correlation (-
.71) is observed for the industrial sector returns while the highest correlation is observed for the 
telecommunication and the utilities sectors.  During the crisis period, consumer staples, industrials, and 
technology sectors experienced a stronger negative correlation with VIX returns.  Post-financial crisis 
correlations show an increase in the negative correlation between returns on industrial sectors and the VIX.  
Overall, these sectors are assumed to be reasonable conveyors of the uncertainty in the U.S. market. 
Panel B, Table 3, shows that the broad market returns from the countries in the sample are 
negatively correlated with VIX returns19.  The smallest correlation is observed for India.  The largest 
negative correlation is observed for Canada, which is consistent with the close economic ties between 
Canada and the U.S. For sectoral equity indices, the results are similar.  All correlation coefficients are 
negative, with the largest negative value observed for the industrial sector for Germany.  The 
telecommunication sector returns in China have the lowest correlation.  Overall, the correlation 
                                                          
18VIX is based on the implied volatility of the tout-of-the-money front and second-month expiration call and put 
options on S&P500.  
19To conserve space, we only report the correlation coefficients for the full sample. 
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coefficients indicate that the VIX, U.S. sectoral indices and aggregate indices across countries share 
information content regarding stock market uncertainty. 
We conducted several diagnostic tests (results not reported to save space) to examine the data.  
First, KPSS and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests indicate returns are stationary.  Next, in the 
majority of the cases, stock returns are negatively skewed, suggesting that the equity markets experienced 
relatively large declines over the sample period.  The Bera-Jarque test indicates a departure from normality.  
The Lagrange Multiplier test (R2 test) detects autocorrelation in the squared residuals.  These test statistics 
confirm that equity returns are stationary and that the second moment is time-varying. 
 
Broad Market Spillover 
Table 4 reports broad stock market spillovers (first row) and sectoral spillovers in the rows below.  
The VAR20 model (equation 1) contains fourteen variables (stock returns from all 14 countries, i.e., N = 
14).  Our analysis concentrates on four distinct regimes, as listed earlier.  The foreign countries are 
arranged in alphabetical order in the table.  In Panel A of Table 4, 13% (highest spillover) of the broad 
market volatility of Canada during the sample period can be attributed to the U.S. market.  In contrast, 
only 3.6% of Indian equity market volatility was attributed to spillovers from the U.S.   There is also 
evidence that spillover from the U.S. market during the period has affected the remaining countries in the 
sample.  These are (in order of low to high spillover) Russia, Korea, China, Italy, Spain, Japan, France, 
Germany, the UK, Australia, and Brazil. 
We believe that investor sentiment and portfolio diversification are critical elements of this 
spillover.  As reported earlier, the U.S. portfolio managers held over $5.7 trillion worth of foreign equities 
from these high spillover countries.  It is logical to assume that the U.S. portfolio managers would not be 
investing in high spillover countries because high spillovers could also lead to a high correlation between 
the countries.  Naturally, such investments would be counter-productive for diversifying the portfolio.   
 
                                                          
20The VAR system in this study sets P equal to one, and forecast horizon H is equal to 10 days. 
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Sectoral Spillover 
The broader stock market index-based spillover analysis in the previous section is limited in scope 
because it assumes that all constituent sectors of the stock index would be equally affecting their 
counterparts in foreign countries.  In this section, we explore spillovers at the sectoral level to provide 
more insights on the degree of connectedness among the equity sectors. 
Panel A, Table 4 shows that the spillover from the U.S basic metals industry contributed to 15.1% 
of the volatility in Canada, while China was least affected (1.9%) among the countries in the sample.  For 
the consumer staples industry, Canada was most exposed (15.3%), while China was least sensitive (.9%) 
tothe U.S. volatility.  The U.S. financial sector was responsible for 16% spillover in the Canadian financial 
sector, the largest spillover among the countries in the sample.  Again, China was the least sensitive.  
Exposure for the remaining countries to the U.S. financial sector is (from low to high spillover): India, 
Russia, Italy, Korea, Spain, France, Japan, Germany, the UK, Brazil, and Australia. The average magnitude 
of spillover in these countries was 6.9%.  This is hardly surprising given that the U.S. portfolio managers 
held almost $6 trillion of equities from these countries.   
For the health care sector, Germany, Canada, the UK, France, Japan, Australia, Italy, Spain, India, 
China, Korea, Canada, and Italy were most affected by the spillover from the U.S. health care industry21.  
In contrast, Korea, China, and India were the least exposed.  For the industrial sector, the order of 
spillover (from low to high) is as follows: China, India, Korea, Italy, Spain, Brazil, France, the UK, Japan, 
Australia, Germany, and Canada.  In the oil and gas sector, 19.1% of the spillover in Canada was 
contributed by the U.S., which is consistent with the fact that Canada is the major provider of energy to 
the U.S.(averaging about 3.3 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2016).India, China, and Korea were the 
countries least affected by the spillovers from the U.S.  In the technologies sector, China, India, Italy, 
Australia, Korea, and Spain were the least affected countries.  In contrast, 14.7% of the spillover in the 
Canadian technology sector returns is contributed by shocks to the U.S technology sector.  For the 
                                                          
21Health care equity index data were not available for Russia and Brazil. 
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telecommunication sector, Brazil was most affected while China was least exposed.  Finally, Canada was 
most affected (11.1%) in the utilities sector, while China again was least affected. 
Overall, spillovers during the full sample period suggest that China experienced the least spillover 
from the U.S. in 7 out of 9 equity sectors while Canada was the highest recipient of spillover in 7 out of 9 
equity sectors.  Brazil experienced the second-highest spillovers during the same period, which is surprising 
given that in 2013, the U.S. holdings of Brazilian equities were valued at less than $130 billion.  A 
fundamental assumption in our paper is that high spillover indicates the degree of connectedness of the 
markets through international diversification of U.S. equity portfolios.  It could, however, also reflect the 
flow of information across international borders.   
 
Spillover: Pre, During, and Post-Financial Crisis 
Spillover results over the three regimes, pre, during, and post-financial crisis, are reported in 
Panels B, C, and D of Table 4, respectively22. During the pre-crisis period, at the broad market level, 
Canada was affected most by the U.S. market, to the tune of 13.6%, while India was affected the least 
(2.6%).  In essence, most developed countries were exposed to the U.S., with developing countries 
relatively less.  At the sectoral level, vulnerable foreign countries are Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Spain, 
and Australia.  In contrast, China, India, and Russia were least sensitive to the U.S.  Surprisingly, Japan 
appears to experience low spillovers despite the fact that during 2013, the U.S. portfolio managers held 
over $600 billion of Japanese equity.  
During the financial crisis, at the broad market level, India again was least exposed while Canada 
was the largest recipient of spillovers from the U.S.  The level of spillovers is slightly higher than the pre-
crisis level:  The median spillover is 6.9%, and Japan, France, the UK, Australia, Brazil, and Canada have 
higher than the median spillover.  Except for Brazil, all countries in the high spillover category are 
                                                          
22Given the sheer volume of information across countries and sectors, this section offers a high-level summary of the 
results reported in Panels A-D, Table 4. 
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developed countries with mature capital markets free of investment restrictions.  Among the lowest 
spillover countries are India, Russia, Korea, and China. 
In the post-crisis era, we expected a lower level of spillovers for the countries that were most 
exposed during the financial crisis.  The rationale is that these countries would implement appropriate 
policies to reduce their U.S.-specific exposure.  However, the results do not support this conjecture.  At 
the broad market level, India was again the lowest recipient, while Canada was the largest recipient of 
spillovers from the U.S.  Somewhat surprisingly, the level of spillovers is slightly higher than it was during 
the financial crisis.  All countries, except India, remained significantly exposed to the U.S. 
To summarize, Table 4 reports the countries and the industrial sectors that were most and least 
exposed to the U.S. broad market and sectoral spillovers.  This unique perspective has been long overdue.  
We are a bit surprised to see that the country-specific average exposure (average across all industries by 
country and by regimes) to the U.S. remains quite similar across all four regimes.  We expected a significant 
time variation post-crisis, possibly due to the regulatory response to limit exposure to the U.S. market. Our 
results show that the foreign markets’ response to the spillover was not overly dramatic as one would have 
expected given the significance of the economic shocks to the U.S.  
 
Vulnerability to the U.S. Originated Spillovers 
Table 5 summarizes the spillover results by sorting these countries in order of high to low 
spillover.  The country with the highest spillover is noted as ‘Most Exposed,’ and the country with the 
lowest spillover is identified as ‘Least Exposed’. For the full sample period, at the broad market level, 
Canada remains as most vulnerable to the U.S.  As we have noted earlier, this is consistent, given the 
geographical proximity and international trade flows between these neighbors.  In comparison, India was 
the least exposed to the U.S. equity market volatility.  While India remains as an important trade partner to 
the U.S., capital market restrictions that still exist in that country for two-way investment flows may be 
responsible for its low exposure to meteor showers from the U.S. 
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Table 5 also presents the most exposed and least exposed in all 4 samples at the sectoral level.  
During the full sample, Canada received the highest spillovers in 7 out of 9 sectors while China scored the 
lowest rank in 7 sectors.  During the pre-financial crisis, Canada scored the highest spillovers in 8 sectors, 
while China was ranked as the country with the lowest spillovers in 8 sectors.  During the financial crisis, 
Canada was ranked again as the most exposed country in terms of spillovers in 7 out of 9 equity sectors.  
In contrast, China was least exposed in 7 out of 9 equity sectors.  Finally, during the post-financial crisis 
period, Canada was most exposed in 8 out of 9 sectors, while China received the lowest spillovers in 6 out 
of 9 equity sectors.  
These results may have policy implications.  From a regulatory standpoint, countries on the 
receiving end can design policies to curb the extent of meteor shower effects and insulate their equity 
sectors.  As markets become less subject to external volatility, it promotes a sense of stability and resilience, 
which may be attractive to global investors. 
 
Non-synchronous Trading 
Previously, to eliminate the nonsynchronous effect, we lagged data from markets that are ahead of 
the U.S .market.  To make sure the results are not sensitive to the alignment of data from different time 
zones23, we now use the two-day rolling average returns, as suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and 
re-estimate the spillover models.  Although the results are not reported24, they are almost identical to the 
previous results.  For instance, the U.S. broad market and sectoral spillovers to China’s broad market and 
the sectors barely change whether we use lagged returns or 2-day rolling returns. The correlation 
coefficients between these two spillover measures for China is 0.997, and for almost all other countries, 
hovers in the mid to high 0.90's, with the lowest being 0.88 (Spain). This suggests that the results are 
robust to non-synchronous markets.  In fact, the markets we would be most concerned with, China, Japan, 
                                                          
23We thank the anonymous referees for suggesting this. 
24 The results of this robustness test are available upon request. 
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Russia, Korea, and India, have spillover estimates that change very little when implementing 2-day rolling 
returns. 
Dynamic Spillovers 
We also performed an additional exercise to identify spillovers from the U.S. using a dynamic 
approach.  It involves selecting a window of trading days over which dynamic spillover is measured.  It 
seems there is no consistency in the literature regarding the ideal length of the window.  Diebold et al. 
(2014) present 100-day rolling spillover estimates, while Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) present 200-day rolling 
estimates, and Demirer et al. (2018) present 150-day estimates.  We chose the 200-day rolling estimates of 
spillovers.  For any sector, there are two plots: Total spillover and Total U.S. sectoral spillover to Others 
(see Figure 1). As noted earlier, the metric of ‘Spillovers to Others” is defined in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009 
and 2012) and is computed by identifying all separate forecast error variance components for a given 
country coming from shocks to other countries and the country itself. ‘Spillover to Others’ can be 
computed by taking the sum of the contributions to the forecast error variance of other countries due to 
U.S. innovations. It is also important to note that each country’s ‘Spillover to Others’ (i.e., contribution to 
other’s forecast error variances) is not constrained to 100%, while ‘Spillovers from Others’ necessarily is 
(Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)). Hence, the y-axis across the figures vary in scale, and for some industries, 
can exceed 100%.  
A few selected details and trends in the data are worthy of emphasis.  At the broad market level, 
total cross-country stock market spillovers were relatively low, between 60% and 65% in 2005, but rose 
sharply to 80% by 2007, and remained high through the Lehman bankruptcy and Global Financial Crisis. 
Total spillovers remained elevated until 2011 but shooting up (to over 85%) once more in 2012 on the 
back of the unfolding European Debt Crisis coupled with uncertainty surrounding the U.S. credit 
downgrade. Total spillovers subsequently fell until a brief spike in 2013, seen as largely driven by U.S. 
spillovers to Others, possibly associated with the Taper Tantrum resulting from the announcement of the 
Federal Reserve’s tapering of unconventional monetary policies. Finally, a sharp spike in Total but not U.S. 
 
20 | P a g e  
 
spillovers at the end of the sample aligns well with uncertainty over global demand growth, specifically 
China, which occurred in 2015.  
Next, we highlight a few selected sectors to show some of the stylized facts on the extent of 
spillovers from the U.S.: 
Oil & Gas: Total spillovers have steadily risen since 2003 from below 40% to above 70% in 2009, 
peaking during the financial crisis. Much of this spillover is attributed to the U.S. shale revolution, as the 
U.S. spillovers to Others rose sharply through the 2000s, roughly doubling from 50% to 100%. Total 
spillovers subsequently declined to spike again in 2011 due to political instability in the Middle East (Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain). Over this period, Brent crude, the U.K. based benchmark oil grade, spiked 
relative to the U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, with the Brent trading at record levels of 
nearly $30/bbl above the WTI. The rise in total spillovers did not propagate from the U.S., as U.S. 
spillovers to Others remained stable, consistent with the shifting focus to Euro and Middle Eastern 
geographies as the sources of the 2011 shocks. Finally, total spillovers steadily declined once more until the 
end of 2014 and rose sharply into 2015 on the back of the largest oil price collapse since the financial crisis. 
Utilities: The dynamic spillovers across the utilities sectors in different countries form an inverted 
“U” shape over the sample history – rising steadily in the early 2000’s, then sharply falling during the 
financial crisis. The episodes of rising spillovers, however, share a common theme: they appear associated 
with bond market volatility – a pattern that’s consistent with the notion of utilities acting as a close equity 
substitute to debt. Spillovers peaked over the financial crisis and steadily declined afterward, but with 
periodic spikes. Total spillovers sharply rose again in 2010, the same year when the 10-year Treasury yield 
rose by about 100 basis points in a matter of two months (from 2.40% in October to about 3.5% in 
December). Another major spike in total spillovers occurred in 2011 during the European Debt Crisis. 
Specific to U.S. spillovers to Others, we observe a sharp rise in 2013 around the Fed Taper Tantrum 
episode.   
Financials: Rolling spillover plots for Financials look strikingly similar to the broad market 
spillovers across countries. The financial sector, being one of the most economically integrated, would, 
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therefore unsurprisingly, bear this pattern. Total spillover across the financial sectors rose sharply over the 
pre-crisis period and peaked during the height of the crisis and the Lehman bankruptcy. Total spillovers 
remained elevated through 2011 and spiked again during the European Debt Crisis, which followed. 
Financial spillovers have since been on a downward trend, reaching pre-crisis levels of about 55% by 2013, 
but then rose sharply to 65% amidst the Fed Taper Tantrum. Total spillovers across financial sectors 
continued to decline into 2015, falling below 55%, a level not seen since 2006. 
 
Portfolio Asset Allocation using Spillover as a Criterion 
An issue is whether the desire to diversify or hedge home country risk is an important factor for 
capital flows from the U.S.  We believe that spillovers and asset allocation decisions are correlated. 
Countries that ex-ante see more significant capital flows from the U.S. are subsequently more exposed to 
higher spillovers.  Consequently, this would lead toa higher correlation with the U.S.  This could, ex-post, 
make them less attractive investments in terms of diversification, ultimately leading to future capital flows 
being diverted from these countries to those with low spillovers (i.e., low correlation). 
In this section, we conduct the minimum variance optimization (MVP) 25  to build globally 
diversified portfolios by allowing a representative U.S. portfolio manager to use the spillover measure as a 
screening tool. We assume that portfolio managers would prefer to invest in low spillover countries for 
diversification benefits.  Table 6 (Panels A-L) reports the Sharpe ratios for the portfolios.  The benchmark 
return is the U.S. equity return (USMCI).  The risk-free rate is based on the 10-yr U.S. Treasury bond. 
 
Full-Sample Criteria 
We adopt three different allocation strategies based on cross-country and cross-sector spillovers.  
Strategy one: No-screening (minimum variance optimization across the full set of assets), Strategy two:  
invest only in low spillover (low spillover is defined as spillover less than the median spillover) countries, 
and Strategy three: invest only in high spillover(high spillover is defined as spillover greater than the 
                                                          
25We do not allow short sell, and maximum weight on a single country or sector is capped at 25%. 
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median spillover) countries. For Strategies two and three, the country indexes(broad market and sectors) 
are selected, and subsequently, the optimum weights are determined based on the MVP optimization. We 
consider performance under two sets of assets: Broad market country-level and the sector indexes. The 
main indicator of profitability is the Sharpe ratio.  At the broad market level (Panel A), the Sharpe ratios 
from Strategy 1 are: .08 (full sample), .59 (pre-financial crisis), -1.72 (financial crisis), and .22 (post-financial 
crisis).  For Strategy two, the Sharpe ratios are: .17 (full sample), .59 (pre-financial crisis), -1.02 (financial 
crisis), and .58 (post-financial crisis).  Finally, for Strategy three, the Sharpe ratios are: -.04 (full sample), .37 
(pre-financial crisis), -1.01 (financial crisis), .25 (post-financial crisis).  At the broad market level, Strategy 
twohas the best Sharpe ratios, even during the financial crisis.   
At the sectoral level (Panel B), similar investment strategies were applied.  With Strategy one, the 
Sharpe ratio is .33, which is higher than the Sharpe ratio from a broad market index-based investment 
strategy (Panel A).  During the pre-financial crisis, the strategy has a Sharpe ratio of .88.  During the 
financial crisis, the performance of this strategy (-1.89) is worse than the Strategy one applied to the broad 
market indices (-1.72).  The post-financial crisis performance of the strategy is better than the results based 
on broad market indices.  The Sharpe ratio is .68, which shows a 209% improvement over the results 
based on broad market indices.  When the universe included only low spillover sectors (sectors with less 
than the median level of spillover), the Sharpe ratios are as follows: .38 (full sample), .98 (pre-financial 
crisis), -.88 (financial crisis), and .93 (post-financial crisis).  Finally, when the universe included sectors 
scoring higher than the median spillover (Strategy three), the Sharpe ratios are as follows: .18 (full 
sample), .53 (pre-financial crisis), -1.57 (financial crisis), and .54 (post-financial crisis). 
 
Sector Diversification 
We also experimented with a single sector(Panels C-K) diversification strategy.  Our rationale is to 
allow for the possibility that a U.S. portfolio manager may seek international diversification within a 
particular industry.  For the basic materials sector, Strategy two generated the highest Sharpe ratio of 1.32 
during the pre-financial crisis period.  Strategy one would have produced a Sharpe ratio of -1.27 during the 
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financial crisis.  In the consumer staples sector, Strategy three produced the highest Sharpe ratio of 1.11 for 
the post-financial crisis period, which is surprising.  We believe that taking an aggressive investment 
strategy on a bull market (recovery period) produces this result.  Strategy one has a Sharpe ratio of -1.91 
during the financial crisis period.  For the financial sector, Strategy two would have a Sharpe ratio of 1.03 
during the pre-financial crisis.  The same strategy would have been ideal during the financial crisis as the 
portfolio would have lost the least.  The healthcare industry offers the best Sharpe ratio during the post-
financial crisis.  The Sharpe ratio is 1.66 for Strategy two.  The lowest Sharpe ratio for this sector is 
observed for Strategy one during the financial crisis.  For the remaining sectors, the highest Sharpe ratios 
for the sample periods are as follows: 1.0 (industrial; pre-financial crisis; low spillover strategy), .94 (oil and 
gas; pre-financial crisis; low spillover strategy), .84 (technology; post-financial crisis; low spillover 
strategy), .33 (telecommunications; post-financial crisis; low spillover strategy), and .82 (utilities; pre-
financial crisis; no screening).  
 
Robustness Test 
We apply the statistical tests of Ledoit and Wolfe (2008) to test whether the baseline strategies 
generate Sharpe ratios statistically different from investing in the broad market index26. The results are 
reported in Table 6, Panel L. Two bootstrapping methods are implemented, one where returns are 
considered i.i.d, and a second where they are allowed to be serially correlated. Consistent with their high 
absolute Sharpe ratios, the low-spillover sector-level strategies generate statistically significant Sharpe ratios, 
while none of the broad market level strategies appear to be statistically significant. These results highlight 
the potential value of international asset allocation at the sectoral level. 
 
Out-of-Sample Rolling Criteria 
While useful for ex-post analysis, the strategy performance under the Full Sample criteria suffers 
from a look-ahead bias. For this reason, we also estimate a fully out-of-sample, 200-day rolling strategy. As 
                                                          
26We thank the editor for suggesting this critical test. 
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before, no shorting is permitted, and the maximum allocation for any particular asset is limited to 25% of 
the total portfolio. Again, we consider two sets of assets: Broad market and sector indexes.  We specifically 
focus on the strategy that selects low (below-median) spillover countries and sectors, and we assume daily 
rebalancing. The dynamic strategy is based on 1-day ahead out-of-sample performance. Each period, 
indices are sorted based on the spillover from the U.S., which is estimated on a 200-day rolling basis. 
Below-median spillover cases are selected, and MVP optimization is conducted to derive the portfolio 
weights (covariance matrix is estimated on the same 200-day rolling period). With a one-day holding 
period, spillovers are updated, and portfolio weights are rebalanced.  
The broad market index-based strategy performs rather poorly out-of-sample (Table 7).The 
average return is 4.88% (annualized), compared to the 6.73% return on USMSCI.  In comparison, the 
country-sector strategy does well.  The annualized mean return is 7.18% with a Sharpe ratio of .41, which is 
surprisingly higher than the Sharpe ratio for the full-sample static low-spillover strategy (0.38). The Sharpe 
ratios, however, are not statistically different from that of investing in the USMSCI (based on the method 
described in Ledoit and Wolf (2008)).The sector-country low-spillover strategy seems to have a cyclical 
pattern (Figure 2, Panel A).  There are extended periods where it outperforms the U.S. broad market 
investment, and other periods where it under-performs. It performed very well on a relative basis from 
2005, pre-financial crisis, and has been lagging from 2010 to about 2015, when it starts to outperform once 
again. 
Finally, the charts(Figure 2, Panel B) plot the dynamic allocation weights of the broad market 
(country-level) strategy27. Interestingly, Canada (notice the flat line) is never selected by the low-spillover 
screen, and Australia rarely.  One possible explanation is that these commodity-dependent advanced 
economies import considerable spillovers from the U.S. Moreover, this is consistent with the close trade 
relationship between Canada and the U.S., driving high spillovers between the two countries. Brazil starts 
to bear positive weight towards the end of the sample period, while several countries see their portfolio 
                                                          
27There would simply be too many charts to display the dynamic weights at the country-sectoral level. 
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allocation vary widely over the entire sample (U.K., Germany, and Japan). Italy received persistent positive, 
near-maximal weight up through 2010, which abruptly fell to near zero in the post-financial crisis period. 
In Figure 3, we plot (standardized) broad market spillovers from the U.S. against the rolling 
contemporaneous correlation between broad market returns of the U.S. and a foreign country.  These 
plots address whether spillovers are just correlations or something else. First, it is important to note that 
there is a mechanical relationship between the two given that spillovers are measured as Generalized 
FEVDs, which are a function of the contemporaneous correlation between two variables (among several 
other things). So, it would be interesting to explore if the contemporaneous correlation dominates the 
spillover estimates over time and across countries and by how much. The data suggest that the two are, in 
fact, correlated, and spillovers from the U.S. tend to track correlation rather closely. However, the two 
measures do diverge episodically, which suggests that spillovers, at times, contain information that is 
different from the correlation. Several countries, including the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Spain, South 
Korea, and India, all have spillover measures that periodically diverge (sometimes to a great extent) from 
the return correlation.  In contrast, for some countries, spillovers seem to be driven by the 
contemporaneous correlation almost always (Japan, Brazil, and Russia). From the perspective of a global 
investor’s asset allocation decisions, the distinction between spillovers and correlation is crucial.  If they 
tracked each other identically, screening investment candidates based on exposure to the U.S. spillovers 
would not add any value over screening candidates based on their correlation with the U.S. market. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
The literature suggests that volatility is both homegrown (heat wave) and imported (meteor 
showers).  Previous attempts to capture the spillovers have relied on broad market indexes, which is not 
very reliable for identifying the equity sectors that are most susceptible to spillovers (meteor showers) from 
the U.S.  Additionally, to our knowledge, there have not been many attempts to use the response to meteor 
showers to guide international asset allocation.  Our paper addresses these two shortcomings.  We identify 
the extent of spillovers from the major U.S. equity sectors (basic materials, consumer staples, financials, 
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health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, telecommunications, and utilities) to their corresponding 
equity sectors in 13 trading and investment partners of the U.S.  The trading partners are Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, Russia, and the United Kingdom.  
Subsequently, we use the spillover measures at the industry level to guide international investments.  
During the full sample period (January 2, 2002 – September 21, 2015), two industries, basic materials and 
oil and gas, contributed most to spillovers from the U.S.  During the same period, utilities sector was the 
least contributor to the spillover.  During the pre-financial crisis (January 2, 2002 – February 14, 2007), oil 
and gas sector (utilities) was the highest (lowest) contributor to the spillover.  During the financial crisis 
(February 15, 2007 – April 30, 2009), we find that the financial sector was not the most significant 
contributor to the spillover.  Instead, the technologies sector contributed to most spillovers.  The utilities 
sector was the lowest contributor to spillovers.  Finally, during the post-financial crisis period (May 1, 2009 
– September 21, 2015), oil and gas industry (utilities) was the largest (smallest) transmitters of volatility. 
The main takeaway from this analysis is that high spillovers lead to high equity market correlation, 
and as a result, reduces diversification benefits from investing in countries receiving high spillovers.  Our 
minimum variance portfolio optimization using spillover measure as a filter confirms this hypothesis.  The 
U.S. portfolio managers can earn high Sharpe ratios by investing in low spillover countries. 
The policy implication of our study is that as the extent of global connectedness rises, 
policymakers need to identify the principal sources of volatility in the domestic capital market and design 
appropriate policy responses to deal with disparate sources of shocks.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) 
recommend the IMF and other institutions to play a greater role with early warning and implementation of 
market disciplines.  To this extent, the results in this study offer a framework for identifying the sectoral 
sources of volatility propagation and the need to adopt sound regulatory policies that promote bilateral 
capital flows but limit excessive spillover. 
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Table 1: Market value of the U.S. holdings of foreign equity, by country, and type of equity, for the countries attracting the most U.S. investment 
(as of December 31, 2013) 
Billions of dollars 
 
Country or region Total Common stock Fund shares Others* 
United Kingdom 978 898 27 54 
Cayman Islands 677 277 277 124 
Japan 604 597 6 0 
Switzerland 430 427 1 1 
Canada 405 387 12 6 
France 343 335 5 4 
Germany 302 279 1 22 
Netherlands 230 216 7 7 
Ireland 228 209 12 7 
Bermuda 179 160 10 9 
Korea, South 147 141 0 6 
Australia 144 131 12 2 
Hong Kong 135 129 5 1 
Brazil 129 98 1 30 
China, mainland 101 98 3 0 
Taiwan 98 98 0 0 
Rest of world 1343 1238 50 56 
Total 6473 5715 429 329 
*Source: U.S. Treasury.  Includes preferred stock, interests in limited partnerships, and other types of equity.  Excludes Hong Kong and Macau, which are reported separately. 
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Table 2: Market value of the U.S. holdings of foreign securities, by industry, as of December 31, 2013 
Billions of dollars 
GICS Code* Industry Total Equity 
Debt 
Long-Term Short-term 
1010 Total Energy 789 614 174 1 
1510 Total Materials 596 456 138 2 
2000 Total Industrial 741 658 82 1 
2500 Total Consumer Discretionary 789 739 49 1 
3000 Total Consumer Staples 586 530 53 3 
3500 Total Health Care 582 548 32 2 
4000 Total Financial 2977 1853 851 272 
4500 Total Informational Technology 653 621 32 0 
5010 Total Telecommunications Services 363 283 79 1 
5510 Total Utilities 192 127 63 2 
 Government** 759 1 695 63 
 Industry Classification Unknown 103 41 57 5 
 Total all industries 9130 6473 2305 353 
 
 
Source: U.S. Treasury.   
*Stands for Global Classification Industry Standard Code. 
**Government includes central, local, and provincial governments, and government-sponsored or guaranteed corporations. Debt issued by international and regional organizations 
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Table 3: Panel A: Correlation between the U.S. broad market and sectoral stock returns with VIX returns 
  Broad Market Basic Materials Consumer Staples Financials Health Care Industrials Oil and Gas Technology Telecommunication Utilities 
Full Sample -0.75 -0.66 -0.68 -0.63 -0.68 -0.71 -0.61 -0.65 -0.55 -0.55 
Pre-financial Crisis -0.73 -0.66 -0.62 -0.66 -0.61 -0.66 -0.52 -0.59 -0.49 -0.46 
Financial Crisis -0.76 -0.67 -0.73 -0.66 -0.69 -0.73 -0.65 -0.72 -0.67 -0.67 
Post-financial crisis -0.80 -0.71 -0.77 -0.71 -0.74 -0.76 -0.69 -0.74 -0.60 -0.57 




Table 3: Panel B: Correlation between foreign broad market and sectoral stock returns with VIX returns 







Financials Health Care Industrials Oil and Gas Technology Telecommunication Utilities 
Australia -0.43 -0.39 -0.22 -0.36 -0.27 -0.39 -0.37 -0.24 -0.16 -0.26 
Brazil -0.5 -0.45 -0.28 -0.44 - -0.37 -0.38 - -0.38 -0.36 
Canada -0.56 -0.39 -0.45 -0.48 -0.32 -0.49 -0.44 -0.35 -0.29 -0.38 
China -0.32 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.1 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 
France -0.48 -0.41 -0.43 -0.44 -0.36 -0.44 -0.4 -0.38 -0.32 -0.31 
Germany -0.47 -0.48 -0.35 -0.49 -0.37 -0.49 - -0.4 -0.36 -0.37 
India -0.21 -0.18 -0.14 -0.18 -0.14 -0.19 -0.13 -0.18 -0.11 -0.11 
Italy -0.46 -0.32 -0.4 -0.43 -0.29 -0.44 -0.37 -0.21 -0.31 -0.38 
Japan -0.39 -0.36 -0.38 -0.34 -0.32 -0.38 -0.32 -0.37 -0.27 -0.16 
Korea -0.29 -0.26 -0.19 -0.26 -0.08 -0.25 -0.21 -0.2 -0.14 -0.15 
Russia -0.28 -0.17 - -0.22 - - -0.22 - -0.2 -0.17 
Spain -0.45 -0.4 -0.28 -0.42 -0.31 -0.41 -0.38 -0.31 -0.38 -0.39 
The UK -0.46 -0.38 -0.36 -0.41 -0.3 -0.42 -0.35 -0.35 -0.32 -0.3 
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Table4: Spillover Analysis 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Broad Market 8.9% 10.0% 13.0% 5.8% 7.3% 7.7% 3.6% 6.3% 7.2% 5.3% 4.9% 6.4% 7.7% 
Basic Materials 10.3% 11.9% 15.1% 1.9% 8.2% 9.1% 2.8% 8.0% 7.7% 6.6% 5.5% 7.0% 9.6% 
Consumer Staples 5.6% 5.9% 15.3% 0.9% 10.3% 8.4% 2.2% 7.7% 8.7% 3.8% -- 5.0% 9.5% 
Financials 9.9% 8.2% 16.0% 1.5% 6.9% 7.8% 3.5% 5.5% 7.0% 5.6% 3.6% 5.7% 8.0% 
Health Care 6.9% -- 10.3% 0.7% 9.8% 10.3% 2.0% 6.7% 9.4% 0.5% -- 6.5% 9.9% 
Industrials 9.3% 8.1% 14.4% 1.2% 8.3% 9.6% 2.7% 7.1% 8.4% 5.1% -- 7.1% 8.3% 
Oil and Gas 10.8% 11.6% 19.1% 1.4% 8.9% -- 0.7% 8.1% 9.0% 4.0% 5.8% 6.6% 10.0% 
Technologies 5.1% -- 14.7% 0.8% 11.0% 11.5% 4.3% 4.9% 10.5% 5.1% -- 6.8% 9.6% 
Telecommunication 2.2% 8.9% 8.0% 0.3% 4.5% 5.9% 0.7% 4.9% 5.9% 2.4% 2.2% 5.8% 6.9% 
Utilities 3.8% 8.5% 11.1% 0.3% 5.1% 5.6% 0.6% 4.4% 1.9% 2.2% 2.0% 5.1% 5.6% 
 
Panel B: Pre-financial Crisis 
 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Broad Market 9.5% 8.5% 13.6% 5.3% 7.7% 8.6% 2.6% 6.4% 5.5% 5.3% 3.8% 6.6% 7.3% 
Basic Materials 8.3% 8.3% 17.2% 0.7% 8.2% 9.7% 1.5% 5.6% 5.5% 6.1% 3.6% 5.4% 7.9% 
Consumer Staples 4.1% 3.4% 18.0% 0.1% 10.2% 11.1% 1.3% 7.9% 6.1% 4.0% -- 3.6% 8.8% 
Financials 8.5% 4.7% 16.1% 0.1% 8.3% 8.8% 1.0% 6.6% 3.4% 4.8% 2.0% 6.3% 6.9% 
Health Care 4.4% -- 13.0% 0.2% 8.7% 8.9% 1.2% 4.8% 4.4% 0.6% -- 1.8% 9.6% 
Industrials 6.5% 4.2% 10.9% 0.1% 7.8% 9.4% 1.4% 7.4% 7.2% 5.3% -- 4.9% 8.0% 
Oil and Gas 10.7% 11.8% 21.2% 0.2% 8.2% -- 0.1% 7.1% 6.4% 2.1% 4.9% 6.9% 9.8% 
Technologies 2.4% -- 15.6% 0.0% 10.9% 11.2% 3.5% 7.4% 8.2% 3.2% -- 7.0% 8.8% 
Telecommunication 1.4% 6.4% 8.0% 0.1% 4.7% 5.8% 0.1% 4.8% 5.0% 3.3% 1.0% 5.2% 6.0% 
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Table 4: Spillover Analysis (contd.) 
Panel C: Financial Crisis 
 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Broad Market 8.4% 9.9% 12.5% 5.1% 7.2% 6.9% 3.7% 6.9% 7.1% 4.7% 4.4% 6.9% 7.3% 
Basic Materials 10.8% 13.0% 14.6% 1.8% 8.2% 8.6% 2.5% 9.1% 7.7% 6.3% 6.6% 6.8% 10.1% 
Consumer Staples 8.6% 5.8% 13.4% 2.2% 11.4% 6.5% 3.8% 6.8% 10.2% 3.9% -- 6.9% 11.4% 
Financials 9.2% 8.3% 14.8% 2.8% 6.6% 7.1% 4.6% 6.4% 7.0% 5.5% 3.4% 6.8% 7.1% 
Health Care 8.0% -- 9.6% 2.3% 11.2% 12.1% 3.4% 6.4% 10.8% 0.7% -- 6.7% 9.8% 
Industrials 9.2% 9.3% 15.8% 1.7% 8.3% 8.9% 2.9% 6.4% 8.0% 4.2% -- 7.0% 7.7% 
Oil and Gas 10.7% 13.2% 17.4% 1.7% 9.6% -- 0.9% 9.8% 9.0% 3.2% 5.6% 6.8% 10.2% 
Technologies 8.8% -- 15.2% 1.5% 10.1% 11.0% 5.1% 6.1% 11.7% 7.3% -- 7.2% 10.3% 
Telecommunication 3.2% 12.8% 6.9% 0.5% 4.9% 5.6% 3.1% 7.3% 8.5% 3.8% 4.0% 7.4% 7.2% 
Utilities 3.8% 12.5% 14.5% 0.3% 6.8% 8.0% 0.3% 6.6% 5.6% 4.4% 4.5% 6.5% 6.9% 
 
Panel D: Post-Financial Crisis 
 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Broad Market 8.2% 9.8% 12.7% 6.4% 7.2% 7.5% 4.2% 6.3% 7.4% 5.8% 5.8% 6.2% 7.8% 
Basic Materials 9.8% 11.3% 14.0% 2.5% 7.9% 9.3% 4.1% 7.9% 8.1% 7.0% 5.5% 7.4% 9.1% 
Consumer Staples 5.0% 9.0% 12.6% 1.0% 8.3% 9.3% 2.8% 7.6% 8.7% 3.2% -- 6.2% 8.6% 
Financials 8.7% 8.9% 13.9% 1.2% 7.3% 8.8% 3.1% 5.8% 7.6% 7.3% 4.8% 5.5% 8.5% 
Health Care 7.1% -- 10.8% 0.7% 9.5% 10.0% 2.0% 8.3% 9.6% 0.5% -- 8.5% 9.9% 
Industrials 9.5% 9.1% 15.5% 2.0% 8.4% 9.9% 3.4% 7.4% 8.6% 6.2% -- 7.4% 8.6% 
Oil and Gas 10.2% 9.4% 18.0% 3.0% 8.6% -- 2.0% 7.7% 9.2% 6.8% 7.3% 7.2% 9.7% 
Technologies 5.0% -- 10.2% 1.4% 10.7% 11.6% 4.9% 2.6% 10.2% 6.7% -- 6.7% 9.4% 
Telecommunication 3.2% 6.2% 7.4% 0.9% 4.6% 6.3% 0.8% 4.8% 3.7% 1.1% 3.2% 6.0% 7.1% 
Utilities 4.3% 7.4% 11.2% 0.6% 4.9% 5.4% 1.3% 3.6% 1.0% 1.7% 3.0% 4.7% 5.7% 
Spillover measures the contribution to the forecast error variance of a country’s returns, coming from the U.S. The DY method (Diebold-Yilmaz (2012))is used for the variance decomposition to identify 















            
Table 5: Winners and Losers based on vulnerability to the U.S. originated spillovers 
 Equity Sectors   
  


















Technologies Telecommunication Utilities 
  
 Sample 
           
  
Full Sample 
Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Germany Canada Canada Canada Brazil Canada   
Lowest India China China China Korea China India China China China   
    




Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Brazil   
Lowest India China China China China China India China China China   
  
 




Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Germany Canada Canada Canada Brazil Canada   
Lowest India China China China Korea China India China China China   
             
  




Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Germany Canada Canada   
Lowest India China China China Korea China India China India China   
Note: In this table, we sort the 13 countries in order of spillovers from the U.S. to identify the highest and lowest spillover countries.  Spillover is measured using the 
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Table 6: Portfolio construction using spillover as a screening tool 
 
Panel A: Broad market 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 5.51% 7.10% 3.78% 12.44% 14.04% 10.63% -19.17% -19.94% -19.82% 7.33% 10.21% 5.62% 
Annual Std. 13.70% 15.75% 14.50% 9.42% 11.76% 9.55% 22.41% 23.42% 23.55% 11.48% 13.07% 12.38% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.08 0.17 -0.04 0.59 0.59 0.37 -1.72 -1.02 -1.01 0.22 0.58 0.25 
Panel B: All Sectors 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 7.18% 7.97% 6.20% 11.71% 13.89% 11.03% -11.49% -7.98% -16.46% 10.10% 10.24% 7.51% 
Annual Std. 8.38% 9.36% 10.02% 6.05% 6.89% 7.42% 11.40% 13.54% 12.98% 7.07% 8.22% 9.19% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.33 0.38 0.18 0.88 0.98 0.53 -1.89 -0.88 -1.57 0.68 0.93 0.54 
Panel C: Basic Materials 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 6.22% 6.35% 6.29% 22.12% 22.04% 20.27% -15.96% -20.27% -12.32% 3.53% 3.53% 3.53% 
Annual Std. 16.04% 16.53% 19.39% 10.71% 11.36% 13.02% 24.56% 25.19% 30.35% 14.80% 15.46% 17.18% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.12 0.12 0.10 1.11 1.32 1.01 -1.27 -0.96 -0.53 -0.05 0.06 0.06 
Panel D: Consumer Goods 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 10.07% 9.94% 7.26% 15.32% 16.67% 8.66% -15.72% -8.53% -19.44% 12.15% 10.67% 15.36% 
Annual Std. 10.51% 10.81% 13.89% 9.89% 10.56% 12.76% 12.78% 17.46% 13.61% 8.61% 8.78% 11.49% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.54 0.51 0.21 1.04 0.91 0.12 -1.91 -0.71 -1.72 0.74 0.92 1.11 
Panel E: Financials 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 4.88% 6.02% 3.78% 12.64% 19.61% 11.19% -23.18% -23.18% -23.18% 7.95% 9.09% 7.65% 
Annual Std. 14.10% 17.78% 14.93% 8.04% 12.16% 8.33% 24.75% 27.92% 27.15% 11.55% 15.37% 12.28% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.59 1.03 0.49 -1.95 -0.97 -1.00 0.25 0.42 0.41 
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Table 6: Portfolio construction using spillover as a screening tool(contd.) 
 
Panel F: Health Care 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 10.07% 10.30% 7.66% 8.49% 9.97% 4.54% -8.41% -8.29% -15.37% 16.85% 18.93% 13.97% 
Annual Std. 9.94% 10.51% 12.05% 7.45% 7.81% 10.33% 12.89% 14.69% 15.89% 9.22% 9.83% 11.36% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.57 0.56 0.27 0.41 0.37 -0.25 -1.29 -0.83 -1.21 1.26 1.66 1.00 
Panel G: Industrials 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 6.85% 8.67% 3.78% 15.52% 16.58% 7.71% -23.18% -22.23% -23.18% 11.57% 9.36% 11.09% 
Annual Std. 13.14% 14.38% 14.38% 9.42% 9.50% 13.98% 20.04% 20.77% 23.74% 11.19% 13.83% 11.85% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.19 0.30 -0.04 0.85 1.00 0.04 -2.10 -1.26 -1.14 0.55 0.49 0.72 
Panel H: Oil and Gas 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 5.37% 6.31% 3.78% 19.01% 19.38% 15.82% -16.18% -17.61% -2.16% 3.53% 3.53% 3.53% 
Annual Std. 15.77% 16.50% 19.37% 12.12% 13.01% 14.97% 22.49% 22.89% 30.46% 14.76% 14.76% 19.93% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.93 0.94 0.58 -1.30 -0.94 -0.20 -0.05 0.06 0.05 
Panel I: Technology 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 5.03% 5.09% 3.78% 8.20% 8.73% 4.54% -19.58% -23.18% -16.15% 12.84% 13.72% 10.89% 
Annual Std. 15.33% 15.71% 20.22% 14.49% 14.67% 22.66% 19.66% 19.98% 25.92% 12.47% 13.24% 14.69% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.25 0.11 -0.11 -1.56 -1.36 -0.77 0.55 0.84 0.57 
Panel J: Telecommunication 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 3.78% 3.78% 3.80% 4.54% 4.75% 4.54% -10.37% -9.75% -14.28% 6.25% 5.91% 8.09% 
Annual Std. 10.94% 12.67% 14.70% 10.16% 11.80% 13.80% 15.69% 16.02% 20.29% 8.38% 10.02% 10.41% 
Sharpe Ratio -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.20 -0.19 -1.35 -0.85 -0.90 0.17 0.33 0.53 
Panel K: Utilities 
 
2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 4.81% 3.78% 5.18% 12.23% 12.56% 11.29% -10.60% -16.43% -10.28% 3.53% 3.53% 3.92% 
Annual Std. 9.64% 11.63% 11.32% 6.33% 8.10% 7.99% 14.95% 17.58% 17.85% 8.71% 10.83% 9.28% 
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Table 6: Portfolio construction using spillover as a screening tool (contd) 
    (Panel L: Statistical significance of Sharpe Ratios, Select Strategies 
 





Broad Market, No Screening 0.438 0.338 
Broad Market, Low Vol. 0.228 0.158 
Broad Market, High Vol.  0.942 0.906 
All Sectors, No Screening  0.072* 0.046** 
All Sectors, Low Vol.  0.070* 0.034** 
All Sectors, High Vol. 0.278 0.21 
 
Ledoit and Wolfe (2008) test for the difference between two Sharpe ratios, bootstrapped method [i.i.d. 
bootstrap (1) and Block bootstrap (2)]. Full-Sample period (2002-2015), daily frequency. The number of 
bootstrapped simulations = 250, block size for (2) = 5 periods. *,**,*** correspond with 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance, respectively. We compare Sharpe ratios of spillover-based strategies against the Sharpe ratio of 










Figure 1: 200-day Dynamic Total Spillover and Spillover to Others in selected sectors 
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Table 7: Out-of-sample Rolling Portfolio Performance 
 
Dynamic Low Spillover Asset Allocation Strategies Sector Strategy Broad Market Strategy S&P 500 
 
Mean Return      7.18%  4.88%   6.37% 
Standard Deviation     8.49%  14.90%   19.30% 
Sharpe Ratio      0.41  0.06   0.11 
 
Dynamic strategy is based on 1-day ahead out-of-sample performance. Each period, Indices are sorted based 
on spillover from the U.S., which is estimated on a 200-day rolling basis. Below-median spillover indices are 
selected (always including U.S. indices), and minimum variance optimization is conducted to select portfolio 
weights (covariance matrix is estimated on the same 200-day rolling period). Holding period for the portfolio 
is assumed to one day.  Subsequently, spillover estimates are updated and portfolio weights are rebalanced. 
Based on Ledoit and Wolfe (2008), the difference in Sharpe ratios between spillover-based asset allocation 
strategies and S&P 500 excess returns are not statistically significant. Risk free rates for Sharpe Ratio 
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Figure 3:Dynamic Spillover from U.S. to country  ‘n’ (black) vs. Rolling Return Correlation of country ‘n’ with U.S. (red) 
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